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A VIEW OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION FROM A
MID-TWELFTH-CENTURY MONASTERY
Amelia J. Uelmen*
INTRODUCTION
Critics of trends in the legal profession often hark back to an elusive
"golden age" in which ideals of service and respect for the truth
tempered lawyers' seemingly prevalent instincts toward ambition and
manipulative greed. As the American Bar Association Commission
on Professionalism reflected in 1986, "Perhaps the golden age of
professionalism has always been a few years before the time that the
living can remember. Legend tends to seem clearer than reality."'
This essay looks back quite a few years-certainly to before the
time the living can remember-to the mid-twelfth century, an era that
some have marked as the dawn of the modern legal profession in
Western European culture. An initial glance indicates that it was no
"golden age" for the profession. Even in the twelfth century, lawyers
were the object of popular hostility and scathing criticism Probing
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School of Law; Adjunct Professor of Legal Ethics; J.D. Georgetown University Law
Center (1993). I am deeply indebted to Robert J. Araujo S.J., Harold J. Berman,
James A. Brundage, John Coughlin O.F.M., R.H. Helmholz, Howard Lesnick, Maria
Marcus, Thomas D. Morgan, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, John J. O'Connell, Russell G.
Pearce, Joseph Pearson, Jonathan Rose, Mark A. Sargent, Daniel Lord Smail, Gerald
F. Uelmen and W. Bradley Wendel for their helpful comments and suggestions on the
manuscript. Particular thanks to Christine Reynolds for her enthusiastic and diligent
research assistance.
1. American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, ".... In the Spirit
of Public Service": A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism 55
(1986).
2. James A. Brundage, The Ethics of the Legal Profession: Medieval Canonists
and Their Clients, 33 Jurist 237, 237 (1973) [hereinafter Brundage, Ethics] ("Every
society that has an identifiable group of professional lawyers has complained about
their behavior, frequently in terms of righteous indignation.... Anyone who reads at
all widely in medieval literature will repeatedly run across passages in which the
manners, morals, and even the very existence of lawyers will be deplored. This theme
is strikingly developed especially in the literature of the twelfth century."); see I John
W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter
and His Circle 193 (1970) ("In medieval times lawyers were often the object of
popular hostility, a reaction which they have endured since the origins of their
profession. This prevailing distrust permeates the writings of the theologians."); see
also Jonathan Rose, Medieval Attitudes Toward the Legal Profession: The Past as
Prologue, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 345 (1998). For a humorous collection of the "cries and
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deeper, the patterns of critique reveal a certain timelessness, and a
sense that the tensions imbedded in both the initial and enduring
framework of the legal profession reflect not so much the weaknesses
of a particular generation, but rather essential struggles in the heart of
human experience.
For some it may seem counterintuitive to travel so far back in time
for insight into "professionalism." How can an era shrouded in
darkness, so permeated by backward and barbaric practices, shed any
light on the legal profession today?3 Even sensitive legal historians
who generally avoid stereotypical images of the medieval
"superstitious bumpkin" have nonetheless been unable to resist taking
their jabs at the twelfth century.4
To compound the challenge of looking so far back, this essay will
focus not on secular texts, but on mid-twelfth-century religious and
theological sources, thus posing an alternative to characterizations of
the "disengagement of the two spheres of the sacred and the profane"
as "a release of energy and creativity analogous to a process of
nuclear fission."5 Further, at the center of this analysis is a text from a
protests of generations of victims and critics" of the legal profession, see Andrew
Roth & Jonathan Roth, Devil's Advocates: The Unnatural History of Lawyers 168
(1989).
3. It would be enough to consider that, in Western Christian Europe, the ordeal
as a method of proof was not officially repudiated until 1215. See H. J. Schroeder,
O.P., Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils 258 (1937) [hereinafter
Disciplinary Decrees] (English translation of Canon 18 of the Fourth Lateran Council
(1215)) ("Neither shall anyone [subdeacon, deacon, or priest] in judicial tests or
ordeals by hot or cold water or hot iron bestow any blessing; the earlier prohibitions
in regard to dueling remain in force."). For a thoughtful and thorough discussion of
the repudiation of the ordeal, see Trisha Olson, Of Enchantment. The Passing of the
Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50 Syracuse L. Rev. 109 (2000); see also
discussion and notes infra at Part III.C.2.a.
4. See, e.g., Richard M. Fraher, Conviction According to Conscience: The
Medieval Jurist's Debate Concerning Judicial Discretion and the Law of Proof, 7 Law
& Hist. Rev. 23, 27, 57 (1989). Fraher noted that the spirited debate about the level
of judicial discretion "challenges the assumption that the people of medieval Europe
were so steeped in traditional, magico-religious views of the world that they could not
accept human judgment in criminal cases" but at the same time placed the marker of
"rationality" in the thirteenth century.
If anything, scholastically trained jurists possessed increasing confidence in
human judgment during the 1200's, when Aristotle's theories of active
human intellection, and of the natural origins of human society and its
government permeated by the study of arts, theology, and law. [These
jurists] lived in the intellectual milieu of Thomas Aquinas, not the mystical
one of Bernard of Clairvaux. In urban culture, it would be anachronistic to
cast the thirteenth-century man on the street as a superstitious bumpkin who
trusted more in miracles and portents of divine or magical powers than in
the works of man.
Id.; see also Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages 3-4 (1938)
(describing how it is not unusual to find history textbook characterizations of the
"Dark Ages" in which "the normal use of natural reason was obscured by blind faith
in the absolute truth of Christian Revelation"),
5. Peter Brown, Society and the Supernatural: A Medieval Change, in Society and
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twelfth-century Cistercian6 monk, Bernard of Clairvaux, hardly the
most cited authority on the legal profession.'
Thus this essay begins with an invitation to suspend judgment by
giving this seemingly obscure time and these sources so rarely
discussed in current legal circles a chance to speak. One may be
surprised by how they shed new light on the timeless and timely
questions and dilemmas of today's legal profession.
This essay first gives a brief contextual overview of the cultural
terrain for the development of the legal profession at mid-twelfth
century. Then, working with a text by Bernard of Clairvaux, it will
explores how Bernard addressed the themes of lawyers'
responsibilities to the public and the limits of advocacy. The themes
are too rich and complex to do even minimal justice in a short essay.
This analysis does not purport to be comprehensive, but rather hopes
to signal tantalizing paths for further research and exploration.
I. A FEW NOTES ON THE MID-TWELFTH-CENTURY CULTURAL
TERRAIN
Scholarship on the political and religious terrain for the initial
development of the legal profession in Western European culture,
particularly on the relationship between law and religion, and the
tensions between secular and ecclesiastical powers, already fills
hundreds of library shelves.8 This section only briefly touches on a
few of the principal cultural themes which will help to put into context
Bernard of Clairvaux's mid-twelfth-century critique of the legal
profession.
the Holy in Late Antiquity 302 (1982); see also Anna Sapir Abulafia, Twelfth-Century
Humanism and the Jews, in Christians and Jews in Dispute: Disputational Literature
and The Rise of Anti-Judaism in the West (c. 1000-1150) 31 (1998) (discussing R.W.
Southern's definition of humanism as denoting "the study of man and his nature, as
opposed to what seems to lie beyond him, that is, the supernatural," and how the
widespread notion that "humanism has to be secular" has prevented many from
recognizing the humanism of scholastic thought).
6. Readers may be more familiar with the prominent nineteenth-century revival
of the Cistercians, the "Trappists," named for the La Trappe monastery in
Switzerland. Thomas Merton, the monk well known for his 1948 autobiography, The
Seven Storey Mountain, lived in the Trappist monastery in Gethsemani, Kentucky.
See generally Louis J. Lekai, The Cistercians: Ideals and Reality 179-92, 213 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 5, at 319 (distancing any connection that monks
might have to the "real world," stating that "[t]he ideal of this society for centuries is
the monk who is not technically human: he lives the life of angels"). For a most
noteworthy exception, see James A. Brundage, St. Bernard and the Jurists, in The
Second Crusade and the Cistercians 25-33 (Michael Gervers ed., 1992) (discussing
Bernard's use of concepts drawn from canon law and the influence of Bernard's ideas
on the development of law itself).
8. For a helpful and accessible overview, see Harold J. Berman, Law and
Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983) [hereinafter Law
and Revolution].
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A. The Political Terrain: Papal Revolution
In Western Europe toward the end of the eleventh and into the
twelfth centuries, a fundamental change took place "in the very nature
of law both as a political institution and as an intellectual concept."9
From what legal historian Harold Berman describes as the "Papal
Revolution," "[p]olitically there emerged for the first time strong
central authorities, both ecclesiastical and secular, whose control
reached down, through delegated officials, from the center to the
localities.""'  While defining and distinguishing the realms of
ecclesiastical and secular authority--sacerdotum and regnurn-is an
ancient theme in Western Christian European culture, 1 in the twelfth
century, it could certainly be considered one of the burning issues of
the day.'2 Because the political and intellectual distinctions were just
taking shape, practical analysis of the tensions between the two realms
is complex. For example, neat lines between civil and ecclesiastical
jurisdiction had not yet emerged; 3 in fact, it may be hard to define
even when courts were functioning as courts. 4
9. Id. at 86.
10. Id.
11. See generally G.R. Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux 152-58 (2002) [hereinafter
Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux] (summarizing the motif of -two swords," representing
royal power and pontifical authority, in ancient and medieval texts); G.R. Evans, The
Mind of St. Bernard of Clairvaux 198 (1983) [hereinafter Evans, The Mind]
(describing the image of the two swords as based on the following account in Luke
22:36-38: just prior to his arrest Jesus told his disciples to prepare for what was to
come-whoever did not possess a sword would be wise to sell his cloak and buy one.
They found two swords and brought them to him, and he said, "It is enough.").
12. See, e.g., Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 144 (naming as the
"great issue of the day" the relation of Church to state jurisdiction); id. at 154
("Bernard was born into a world extremely conscious of a fundamental conflict of
authority between spiritual and temporal, Church and state."); R.H. Helmholz,
Magna Carta and the lus Commune, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297, 311-14 (1999) (describing
the eleventh- and twelfth-century Church's focus on establishing freedom of the
clergy from control by the laity). For background on the 1077-1122 "Investiture
Contest," the Church's struggle to free itself from secular rulers' attempts to interfere
with and control the appointment of bishops, see generally Law and Revolution,
supra note 8, at 85-119 and Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 155.
13. For example, questions of jurisdiction were particularly complex since Bishops
held lands and rights equivalent in extent and status to those of a secular baron, and
thus could preside over secular courts. See Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note
11, at 144, 155. Further, both ecclesiastical and secular courts may have had a claim
for jurisdiction based either on the subject matter, or in cases where the clergy were
accused, on claims of personal privilege. See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Civil Jurisdiction
and the Clergy, in The lus Commune in England 193-94 (2001) (describing how the
distinction between ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction rested not only on the
characterization of claims as either spiritual or temporal, but also on the privilegium
fori, the medieval presumption that men were entitled to be judged by their own law).
See generally Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 144-45; G.R. Evans, Law
and Theology in the Middle Ages 1-4 (2002) [hereinafter Evans, Law and Theology].
14. Evans, Law and Theology, supra note 13, at 42 (stating that church courts,
separate institutions staffed by professionals to resolve disputes or prosecute crimes,
did not develop until the twelfth or thirteenth century).
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To put it mildly, Bernard of Clairvaux lived in a world of political,
social and religious flux. In fact, he himself had a hand in defining and
shaping some of the principal doctrines which emerged from the Papal
Revolution. 15
B. The Legal Terrain: A Nascent Professional Class of Jurists
Partially in connection with the development of strong central
secular and ecclesiastical authorities, a class of professional lawyers
and judges was emerging in both the secular and ecclesiastical
realms. 6 The marker of the dawn of the Western European legal
profession is of course debatable, and depends to a large extent on
one's definition of "profession."17 Some scholars mark the beginning
of the legal profession towards the end of the twelfth century.,
15. For example, the doctrine of papal plentitude of power, that the Pope held
ultimate authority to hear appeals "from the whole world" was just emerging during
this time, as elaborated in one of the principal texts this essay explores, Bernard of
Clairvaux's On Consideration. Evans, Law and Theology, supra note 13, at 44; see also
13 The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux, Five Books on Consideration, Advice to a
Pope, Book 3:6 (John D. Anderson & Elizabeth T. Keenan trans., Cistercian Pub.
1976) [hereinafter On Consideration] ("Appeal is made to you from the whole world:
this, indeed, is testimony of your unique primacy.").
16. Law and Revolution, supra note 8, at 86.
17. For a helpful starting point, see Paul Brand, The Origins of the English Legal
Profession vii-viii (1992) ("[A] 'professional lawyer' is someone recognized by others
as having a special expertise in legal matters and who is willing to put that expertise at
the disposal of others, who is paid for doing this and who spends a major part of his
time in this professional activity. A 'legal profession' exists when professional lawyers
start being singled out for special regulation in their professional activity."). Compare
James A. Brundage, The Rise of the Professional Jurist in the Thirteenth Century, 20
Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 185, 185 (1994) [hereinafter Brundage, Professional Jurist]
("I take the term profession or professional to mean a highly skilled, terminal
occupation that can only be entered through some kind of formal admission. These
practitioners undertake to abide by a set of ethical standards, and enjoy in return a
publicly sanctioned monopoly on the practice of their trade and a measure of
authority resulting from their peculiar skills, coupled with high social status and
esteem."); with James A. Brundage, The Rise of the Professional Canonists and the
Development of the Ius Commune, 81 Kanonistische Abteilung 26 (1995) (describing
the stages of professionalization of canonists).
18. For example, Professor Brand argues that England before the middle of the
twelfth century was a country without professional lawyers. Brand, supra note 17, at 3
(noting that the emergence of professional lawyers was "a response to the changed
legal environment created by a number of separate but linked developments in the
English legal system which took place in and after the reign [1154-1189] of Henry II");
see also Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of
Regulation, 48 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 4 (1998) (beginning with legislation in the mid-
thirteenth century); Helmholz, supra, note 12, at 346 (discussing the 1215 Magna
Carta's vague requirement that judges must "[k]now the law," with no educational
requirements or objective standards for ascertaining the requisite knowledge). Using
a similar definition to Brand's, James Brundage has concluded that in Western
Europe lawyers became professionals through a gradual process that began in the late
twelfth century. Brundage, Professional Jurists, supra note 17, at 185; see also Evans,
Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 141 (noting that in the 1140s, "[a]head lay the
era of the professional law schools at Bologna and of the kind of papal headhunting in
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Others have traced an earlier and more gradual development,
spanning across the twelfth century."
Might the mid-twelfth century be too soon for a critique of the
professional lawyer as we understand the term today? Even if the
lawyers who were the subject of Bernard's critique may be defined as
"proto-professionals" rather than professionals, 20 his critique is
nonetheless helpful. In the initial seed of the Western European legal
profession, Bernard was able to identify and shed light on the
essential tensions that would later track the profession's development
throughout the centuries.
C. The Educational Terrain: The First Law School
It is illuminating to place a mid-twelfth-century critique of the legal
profession against the backdrop of the initial development of the
Western European universities, and in particular, of the first law
school at the University of Bologna. By the mid-twelfth century, the
University of Bologna was drawing young men from all parts of Italy
and Western Europe, attracted by its exclusive concentration on the
study of law.2' Many students were among the wealthiest, as law was
widely considered the most lucrative occupation and the broadest
pathway to public advancement.22
those schools in which Innocent Ill was to engage in the period up to the Fourth
Lateran Council of 1215").
19. See, e.g., Manilo Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe 1000-1800, at
55-56 (1995) (concluding that Italy in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries shows
proof of a return to the study and use of Roman law; and noting that in some areas of
Italy the technical quality of notarial acts showed a clear improvement; already by the
beginning of the twelfth century, "[mlore and more concentrated thought was
devoted to legal norms and the behavior they regulated. At the same time, juridical
theory helped to give a new quality and a new dignity to the work of practitioners,
notaries first among them"); Law and Revolution, supra note 8, at 116 (stating that a
class of professional lawyers and judges emerged in the wake of the Papal
Revolution); Susan Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals 258 (1994) (conceding that the
twelfth century is probably too early to talk about a legal profession in France, but
also noting that government at almost every level was beginning to use at least semi-
professionals in making records and arguing from them); see also Brand, supra note
17, at 50-54 (acknowledging the presence of mid-twelfth-century "proto-
professionals" who may have assisted and represented litigants, and even charged for
their services, but who did not quite fit the definition of "professional" because of the
sporadic nature of their legal work); Evans, Law and Theology, supra note 13, at 50
(noting that by 1158, Bologna had enacted a statute requiring the study of law for five
years before one may be a judge or jurisconsultant); John H. Mundy, Europe in the
High Middle Ages 1150-1300, at 283 (3d ed. 2000) (noting the increasing
professionalization of legal personnel in the twelfth century). See generally Reynolds,
supra at 231 (discussing twelfth-century legal developments in Italy); Susan Reynolds,
Medieval Law, in The Medieval World 485-502 (Peter Linehan & Janet L. Nelson
eds., 2001) (including an excellent bibliography); Rose, supra note 18, at 8-12
(discussing the development and characteristics of proto-professional attorneys).
20. See Brand, supra note 17, at 50-54. See generally Rose, supra note 18, at 8-12.
21. See generally Bellomo, supra note 19, at 112-14.
22. Baldwin, supra note 2, at 84; Bellomo, supra note 19, at 114; Hastings
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It is not shocking that this development provoked critique from
theologians and leading religious figures, perhaps in part motivated by
fear that the study of law would become theology's "brain drain." As
John Baldwin describes, "[I]n the rivalry of self-esteem and the
competition for good students the theologians naturally tended to
depreciate their medical and legal colleagues by calling theirs the
'lucrative sciences' (lucrative scientiae).'23  In Paris, students were
warned not to abandon theology for the lucrative science as lawyers
and doctors, and those who did were considered to have "gone a
whoring from thy God," and were compared to the money changers
Christ drove from the Temple.24
For their own part, the nascent law schools did not exactly welcome
an interdisciplinary approach with open arms. In the University of
Bologna, as David Knowles describes, there was "absolutely no
connection" between the law university and the other faculties;
theology was "practically confined to the schools of the religious
orders. "25
This was perhaps due in part to the nature of the law texts and
curriculum. The celebrated master of law, Irnerius, introduced the
systematic study of the whole Corpus Iuris Civilis as the regular
curriculum for legal education.26 As Hastings Rashdall depicts:
If the whole Corpus Iuris was to be taught, it required the undivided
attention of its students; henceforth, the student of law had no
leisure for other studies and the student of arts no longer ventured
to meddle with so vast and so technical a subject until mere school-
education was over. ... [F]rom the time of Irnerius law ceases to be
a branch of rhetoric and therefore an element in a liberal education;
it becomes a purely professional study for a special class of
professional students.
27
Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages 132-33 (F.M. Powicke &
A.B. Emden eds., 1964) (describing the political and commercial value of legal
knowledge).
23. Baldwin, supra note 2, at 85; see also Bellomo, supra note 19, at 114;
Brundage, Ethics, supra note 2, at 238 ("The theologians, too, had their own ax to
grind with the lawyers, particularly the canonists, whom they perceived as rivals and
whom they accused of monopolizing ecclesiastical preferments to the detriments of
both the Church at large and of theological scholars in particular.").
24. Baldwin, supra note 2, at 85-86; see also Bellomo, supra note 19, at 114.
25. David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought 147-48 (2d ed. 1962).
26. Rashdall, supra note 22, at 123; see also Knowles, supra note 25, at 142.
27. Rashdall, supra note 22, at 124; see also Bellomo, supra note 19, at 114
(describing the efforts of those who learned to use "words six-feet long" and
committed to memory with great effort the entire Corpus luris); Knowles, supra note
25, at 143 (asserting that Irnerius made the study of law "more scientific, technical
and professional than before, and established it firmly and finally as a subject for
higher education, not merely as a part or appendage of the trivium"); Rashdall, supra
note 22, at 132-33 (surmising that such marked the birth of a new class of older, and
more independent students, often of noble birth and good position: "Legal knowledge
possessed then, as it still possesses, a political and commercial value to which no
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Thus the structure of the curriculum set law students up for
indifference to other disciplines because the sheer volume of material
left them with no time to pursue the rigors of theology. 28 Although
one should be careful not to read too much into the formal
distinctions in curriculum, it is useful to place Bernard's critique
against a backdrop of some level of indifference, if not rivalry and
hostility, between the disciplines of law and theology.29
D. The Religious Terrain: Clergy Prohibited from Studying Civil Law
Finally, it is also instructive to note that the Papal Revolution
consisted not only in defining the Church's relationship with secular
authority, but also in asserting vigorous internal disciplinary measures
which aimed to reduce the dangers and excesses of clergy being too
intertwined with secular life." For example, a portion of Canon Nine
purely speculative knowledge can pretend.").
28. See Alexander Murray, Reason and Society in the Middle Ages 222-24 (1978)
(stating that in the mid-twelfth century, even the development of canon law has been
considered to widen rather than bridge the gap); Rashdall, supra note 22, at 135-36
(describing the canon law scholars as in closer relation with civil lawyers; and that
while the chair of theology no doubt remained, in the later twelfth century "the study
of theology proper ceased to have any special importance at Bologna"); id. at 261
("[F]rom the time when canon law became fully differentiated from theology, no
secular studium of theology of any importance existed at Bologna. In the academic
organization a faculty of theology had no place till 1364. The consequences of this
constitutional peculiarity were of the highest importance. From the Schools of
Bologna strictly theological speculation was practically banished, and with it all the
heresy, all the religious thought, all the religious life to which speculation gives rise.");
Peter Stein, Vacarius and the Civil Law, in Church and Government in the Middle
Ages, Essays Presented to C.R. Cheney on His 70th Birthday 126 (1976) (noting that
immediate pupils of Irnerius concentrated their attention exclusively on civil law,
ignoring canon law as unworthy of their attention, for any properly trained civilian
lawyer should have been able to handle and harmonize the discordant authorities of
canon law); see also Law and Revolution, supra note 8, at 130 (stating that newly
developed canon law of the Church would not broaden the curriculum until the latter
half of the twelfth century).
29. Commenting on this manuscript, Professor Helmholz drew my attention to a
more nuanced analysis, stating, "[I]t may be true that there was no connection
between the two faculties, but this did not mean that lawyers knew nothing of
theology. One does not find it often in the Commentaries, but it does appear."
Letter from R.H. Helmholz, Ruth Wyatt Rosenson Professor of Law, University of
Chicago Law School, to the author (Oct. 15, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review). It would be interesting to explore further the historiography of the initial
development of law schools, and particularly the extent to which the connection
between the study of law and theology have been played down because of later
theories of legal education as a technical science which leaves little room for religious
reflection.
30. Here, too, advice to clergy to avoid excessive entanglement with secular affairs
is an ancient Christian theme. See, e.g., 2 Timothy 2:4 ("In the army, no soldier gets
himself mixed up in civilian life because he must be at the disposal of the man who
enlisted him."); Disciplinary Decrees, supra note 3, at 90 (Council of Chalcedon (451)
Canon 3 prohibited clerics from involvement in secular administration except that
regarding the guardianship of minors, and the care of widows, orphans and the
defenseless.); Ernst Sachur, The Influence of the Cluniac Movement, in The Gregorian
A VIEW OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
from the Second Lateran Council, convened by Pope Innocent II in
1139, focused on concern about professional studies:
Moreover, the evil and detestable practice has grown, so we
understand, whereby monks and canons regular, after receiving the
habit and making their profession, are learning civil law and
medicine with a view to temporal gain, in scornful disregard of the
rules of their blessed teachers Benedict and Augustine. In fact,
burning with the fire of avarice, they make themselves the advocates
of suits; and since they have to neglect the psalmody and hymns,
placing their trust in the power of fine rhetoric instead, they confuse
what is right and what is wrong, justice and iniquity, by reason of the
variety of their arguments. But the imperial constitutions testify that
it is truly absurd and reprehensible for clerics to want to be experts
in the disputes of law courts. We decree by apostolic authority that
lawbreakers of this kind are to be severely punished.31
It is against this cultural backdrop that Bernard of Clairvaux took
on some of the most interesting religious, political and legal questions
of his time.
II. ADVICE FROM A "MODERN CHIMAERA": BERNARD OF
CLAIRVAUX
Medieval monastic culture might be the last place one would look
for insight into the developing legal profession. Instead, Bernard's
writings reveal a surprising openness, breadth and flexibility that
Epoch: Reformation, Revolution, Reaction? 15 (Shafer Williams ed., 1964)(discussing Pope Gregory VII's eleventh-century church reforms which reaffirmed the
importance of "a clergy free from all vices and devoting itself completely to the
service of the church ... and recognizing implementation included efforts to limit
priests' involvement with secular cases). See generally Ralph V. Turner, Clerical
Judges in English Secular Courts: The Ideal Versus the Reality, 3 Medievalia et
Humanistica: Studies in Medieval & Renaissance Culture 75, 75 (1972) (discussing the
tension between the ecclesiastical ideal of clergy remaining disentangled from worldly
affairs in order to "care for souls" and the reality of their deep entanglement in
secular affairs).
31. 1 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils 198 (Norman P. Tanner ed.)
[hereinafter Tanner] (Canons of the Second Lateran Council, 1139). This provision is
identical to the prohibitions issued in the provincial Council of Clermont (1131). Id. at
198. Note that the same canon also includes prohibitions against the study of
medicine, for somewhat different reasons:
There are also those who, neglecting the care of souls, completely ignore
their state in life, promise health in return for hateful money and make
themselves healers of human bodies. And since an immodest eye manifests
an immodest heart, religion ought to have nothing to do with those things of
which virtue is ashamed to speak. Therefore, we forbid by apostolic
authority this practice to continue, so that the monastic order and the order
of canons may be preserved without stain in a state of life pleasing to God,
in accord with their holy purpose. Furthermore, bishops, abbots and priors
who consent to and fail to correct such an outrageous practice are to be
deprived of their own honours and kept from the thresholds of the church.
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enlightens some of the timeless themes of legal ethics.32 This section
will explore the specific background of Bernard's life and the text
which is the focus of the analysis. The next section will probe the
text's commentary on specific themes in legal ethics.
Born in 1090, just five years after the death of Pope Gregory VII,
Bernard was raised in Burgundy, France, the heartland of reform
monasticism.33 In the tenth century, the monastery at Cluny was itself
an expression of reform and a faithful return to the Benedictine rule.34
By the twelfth century, however, elaborate liturgies and indulgence in
rich food and drink called for its own reform. Robert of Molesme
founded the monastery at Citeaux so the monks could live, as Louis J.
Lekai describes, "an ascetic life in poverty and perfect solitude,
providing for themselves, like the Apostles of Christ, through their
own labor."35
In 1113, at the age of twenty-three, Bernard entered the monastery
at Citeaux, bringing with him thirty others, including several members
of his family. Shortly thereafter, in 1115, he was appointed abbot of a
new monastery in Clairvaux. Clearly a skilled and charismatic leader,
Bernard was called upon to help resolve some of the most difficult
crises and tensions of his time, including the disputed papal election of
1130.36 In 1146, he was called on by the Pope to preach the Second
Crusade.37
All of this work brought Bernard, to his dismay, out of the
monastery into the tangle of worldly affairs. As he expressed in a
letter to the Carthusian Prior of Portes:
32. See, e.g., Joel Lipkin, The Entrance of the Cistercians into the Church
Hierarchy 1098-1227: The Bernardine Influence, in The Chimaera of His Age: Studies
on Bernard of Clairvaux 62 (Rozanne Elder & John R. Sommerfeldt eds., 1980)
("Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of Bernard of Clairvaux's mentality was his
ability to combine, without any apparent tension, an intense spirituality and a
practical grasp of political reality."); see also Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note
11, at 152-53 (discussing the "immensely pragmatic, this-worldly dimension" of
Bernard's political theology).
33. On Consideration, supra note 15, at 5; see also Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux,
supra note 11, at 7 (describing the "experimentation in the religious life" which
permeated the culture of Bernard's time: "[M]onks and canons should be of one mind
in singleness of purpose in the Christian life, but they need not adopt a single style or
form of life."). For a concise and helpful historical overview of monasticism, see
generally Fabio Ciardi, O.M.I., Koinonia: Spiritual and Theological Growth of the
Religious Community (2002) [hereinafter Koinonia], particularly Part II: Historical
Understanding. For an excellent overview of Bernard of Clairvaux's theology, see
generally Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11.
34. See Law and Revolution, supra note 8, at 88-94 (providing a general
background on the Cluniac reform); Koinonia, supra note 33, at 117-26 (briefly
describing Benedictine monastic life).
35. Lekai, supra note 6, at 14.
36. Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 13-14.
37. Id. at 1.6-17.
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May my monstrous life, my bitter conscience, move you to pity. I
am a sort of modern chimaera, neither cleric nor layman. I have
kept the habit of a monk, but I have long ago abandoned the life. I
do not wish to tell you what I dare say you have heard from others:
what I am doing, what are my purposes, through what dangers I pass
in the world, or rather down what precipices I am hurled. If you
have not heard, enquire and then, according to what you hear, give
your advice and the support of your prayers."
This uneasiness with a life of tension between the "world" and the
monastery permeates the text of De Consideratione ("On
Consideration"),39 Bernard's series of letters of advice to Eugenius III,
his own student and fellow Cistercian, who was elevated to the Papacy
in 1145.40 Throughout the text, he confronts the dilemma of how an
active life in the "world" can be led with a "proper Christian set of
priorities. 4
1
Bernard was not particularly happy with Eugenius's appointment.
In a letter to the Roman Curia, he complained:
Had you no other wise and experienced man amongst you who
would have been better suited for these things? It certainly seems
ridiculous to take a man in rags and make him preside over princes,
command bishops, and dispose of kingdoms and empires.
Ridiculous or miraculous? Either one or the other.42
Part of Bernard's concern seems to have stemmed from Eugenius's
particular nature:
I am not happy in my own mind, for his nature is delicate, and his
tender diffidence is more accustomed to leisure than to dealing in
great affairs. I fear that he may not exercise his apostolate with
sufficient firmness. What do you think will be the feelings of a man
who from the secrets of contemplation and the sweet solitude of his
heart, suddenly finds himself plunged into a vortex of great affairs,
like a child suddenly snatched from his mother's arms, like a sheep
being led to sacrifice and finding itself in unfamiliar and unwelcome
surroundings?
43
Thus he asked the Curia to support him in the "excessive and
unaccustomed load, formidable even for a giant, even for the very
angels themselves. ' 44 Bernard's personal concern for Eugenius as his
own spiritual son and fellow monk permeates On Consideration,
38. The Letters of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux 402 (Bruno Scott James trans.,
Cistercian Pub. 1998) [hereinafter Letters].
39. On Consideration, supra note 15.
40. See Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 151.
41. Id.
42. Letters, supra note 38, at 385-86.
43. Id. at 386.
44. Id.
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giving the text a particular tone of intimate and sometimes urgent
candor.
A. Lessons in Papal Time Management
Part of the reason that Eugenius, "the most harried administrator in
western Christendom,"45 was submerged with work was the pressure
of hearing litigation. Bernard gently admonished:
I ask you, what is the point of wrangling and listening to litigants
from morning to night? And would that the evil of the day were
sufficient for it, (Mt. 6:34) but the nights are not even free! Your
poor body scarcely gets the time which nature requires for rest
before it must rise for further disputing. One day passes on
litigation to the next, one night reveals malice to the next, (Ps. 18:3)
so much so that you have no time to breathe, no time to rest and no
time for leisure.46
Within this context, Bernard's subtle jab against the litigants' "evil
of the day" seems less a function of critique of the legal profession and
more an expression of delicate and personal concern for Eugenius's
physical health.
Many of Bernard's seeming barbs against lawyers might be best
understood as practical lessons in "papal time management" rather
than a critique of the legal profession per se. "It is one thing to rush
headlong into these affairs when there is an urgent reason, but it is
another, entirely, to dwell on them as if they were important and
worthy of this kind of papal attention. 47
The tangle of legal affairs is not necessarily an evil in itself, but
becomes a concern when it absorbs so much of the Pope's attention
that it detracts from his duties as the successor of Peter:
Clearly your power is over sin and not property, since it is because
of sin that you have received the keys of the heavenly kingdom, to
exclude sinners not possessors. The Lord confirms this when he
says, 'that you may know that the Son of Man has power on earth to
forgive sins.' (Mt. 9:6). Tell me, which seems to you the treater
honor and greater power: to forgive sins or to divide estates? 4
Against the backdrop of the Cistercian reform, Bernard's
suggestions to Eugenius are not surprising: keep involvement in
litigation to a minimum. He advised:
45. On Consideration, supra note 15, at 16 ("In undertaking to advise Eugene,
Bernard addressed a man existing at the center of an unbearable paradox. The pope
was at the same time a Cistercian monk and the most harried administrator in western
Christendom.").
46. Id. at Book 1:4.
47. Id. at Book 1:8.
48. Id. at Book 1:7.
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Therefore, let it be your custom to become involved in only those
cases where it is absolutely necessary (and this will not be every
case) and decide them carefully but briefly, and to avoid frustrating
and contrived delays. The case of a widow requires your attention,
likewise the case of a poor man and of one who has no means to pay.
You can distribute many cases to others for judgment and many you
can judge unworthy of a hearing. What need is there to hear those
whose sins are manifest before the trial?49
Each of these aspects of Bernard's critique probe not so much the
heart of the legal profession as the specific challenge to Eugenius to
order his attention and his time according to his role as a spiritual
leader.
B. Respect for the Regnum
Certain passages in Bernard's letters describe "worldly" affairs as
lower in the hierarchy of concerns: "These base worldly concerns have
their own judges, the kings and princes of the world."5 Yet, they
would also seem to imply a certain respect for the "work" within the
"territory" of others. As Bernard questions, "Why do you invade
someone else's territory? Why do you put your sickle to someone
else's harvest? Not because you are unworthy, but because it is
unworthy for you to be involved in such affairs since you are occupied
by more important matters."5 1 While the passage leaves no doubt
about which realm is superior, a clear distinction between sacerdotum
and regnum did not necessarily denigrate the "harvest" of the regnum.
In an earlier letter to the monk Adam, dated about 1125, Bernard's
discussion of lay vocations also indicates his profound respect for the
diverse ways in which the "good" may be manifest, depending on
one's vocation and on the context:
Now so that you may understand me you must know that there are
some things wholly good and others wholly evil.... And between
these two extremes there are middling things; things neither good
nor evil, but indifferent. And these things derive their character of
goodness or badness from the circumstances of manner, place, and
time.... [S]ome middle things can often become either wholly good
or wholly evil. Thus marriage is neither enjoined nor forbidden; but
49. Id. at Book 1:13.
50. Id. at Book 1:7.
51. Id. at Book 1:7. This respect for "lay territory" is also prominent in the Fourth
Lateran Council in 1215. See, e.g., Disciplinary Decrees, supra note 3, at 274 (English
translation of Canon 42: "As desirous as we are that laymen do not usurp the rights of
clerics, we are no less desirous that clerics abstain from arrogating to themselves the
rights of laymen. Wherefore we forbid all clerics so to extend in the future theirjurisdiction under the pretext of ecclesiastical liberty as to prove detrimental to
secular justice; but let them be content with the laws and customs thus far approved,
that the things that are Caesar's may be rendered to Caesar, and those that are God's
may by a just division be rendered to God.").
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once contracted it cannot be dissolved. What, therefore, before the
nuptials was clearly a middling thing, after them becomes, for the
persons married, a thing wholly good. Likewise, whether a secular
person should hold property or not is a matter of indifference; but
for a monk it is wholly evil, for he is not permitted to hold any
property at all.
52
Read in this light, Bernard's critique of the legal profession is not a
blunt recommendation to flee from the world. In his sermons he
explicitly acknowledged the benefits of specialized knowledge.53
Bernard also explicitly recognized the necessity of some system of
litigation to resolve disputes and address injustice:
Fraud, deceit and violence run rampant in our land. False accusers
are many; a defender is rare. Everywhere the powerful oppress the
poor. We cannot abandon the downtrodden; we cannot refuse
judgment to those who suffer injustice. (Ps. 102:6; 145:7). If cases
are not tried and litigants heard, how can judgment be passed?54
Indeed, a profound appreciation and respect for legal procedure
permeates the text of On Consideration. For example, appeals to the
Pope may be a unique occasion for justice: "What could be as fitting
as this: that the invocation of your name liberates the oppressed and
leaves the crafty with no refuge? ' 56 On the other hand, Eugenius
must take care to assure that the process is not abused. The "law of
appeals itself" requires that one who appeals without cause be dealt
with "so that he repents of having done what he did not fear to do,
and so that he cannot mock the punishment of the innocent. '57
Bernard is relentless in his care for even the minutia of justice, such as
the reimbursement of costs: "In the frequent appeals which are made
today, can you name for me anyone who has even reimbursed the
52. Letters, supra note 38, at 28; see also On Consideration, supra note 15, at
Book 5:12 ("God accomplishes different ends through different spirits."). See
generally John R. Sommerfeldt, The Social Theory of Bernard of Clairvaux, in Studies
in Medieval Cistcercian History 38-46 (1971).
53. See M. Basil Pennington, Bernard of Clairvaux: A Lover Teaching the Way of
Love 114-16 (1997) (translation of On the Song of Songs 36:2-3: "All knowledge is
good in itself provided it be founded on truth ...."); see also Evans, Bernard of
Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 49 (discussing Bernard's respect for specialized
knowledge).
54. On Consideration, supra note 15, at Book 1:13.
55. See generally Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 146-49(summarizing Bernard's discussions of legal procedure); Brand, supra note 17, at 5-13
(stating that analysis of the Legis Henrici Primi indicates that litigation did not call for
much specialist expertise).
56. On Consideration, supra note 15, at Book 3:6; see also id. at Book 3:10 ("[D]o
not think you are wasting time if you consider how you can return appeals to their
legitimate use, if this is possible.... I admit that appeals are a great and general good
for the world and that they are as necessary for men as the sun itself: truly, indeed, the
right of appeal is the sun of justice (Mal. 4:2) which appears and rebukes the world of
darkness.").
57. Id. at Book 3:6, 3:7.
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money for the expense of the journey to the person against whom he
had appealed? 5
s
Thus Bernard's critique seems to be framed, for the most part, in
terms of the manner in which litigation is handled, not of litigation or
of the legal profession in and of itself.59 As Bernard admonished,
"Let cases be tried, but in a suitable manner. The way which is
frequently followed now is completely detestable."6
III. A TIMELESS AND TIMELY CRITIQUE
A. A Two-Step Leap
To fully appreciate the importance and value of the mid-twelfth
century religious critique of the legal profession, and Bernard of
Clairvaux's particular critique, one must make a two-step leap of
reason and faith. The first step is to move beyond the not uncommon
stereotype of the "Dark Ages" as a time in which "the normal use of
natural reason was obscured by blind faith,"'" awaiting the dawn of
more "rational" state-imposed professionalized mechanisms for
dispute resolution.
One of the pioneers in the intellectual groundwork to bridge the
chasm between law and religion, Harold Berman, eloquently
challenges:
If we see law in dictionary terms merely as a structure or "body" of
rules laid down by political authorities, and similarly see religion
merely as a system of beliefs and practices relating to the
supernatural, the two seem connected with each other only very
distantly or in only a few rather narrow and specific respects. But in
reality both are much more than that. Law is not only a body of
rules; it is people legislating, adjudicating, administering,
negotiating-it is a living process of allocating rights and duties and
thereby resolving conflicts and creating channels of cooperation.
Religion is not only a set of doctrines and exercises; it is people
manifesting a collective concern for the ultimate meaning and
purpose in life-it is a shared intuition of and commitment to
transcendent values.62
Reconceptualizing both law and religion and the connection
between the two opens up a broader horizon, shedding light on how
58. Id. at Book 3:9.
59. See Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 146 (commenting that this
text echoes contemporary legal thinking: "justice is above all a device for ensuring
that the strong do not always win").
60. On Consideration, supra note 15, at Book 1:13.
61. See Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages 3-4 (1938).
62. Harold J. Berman, Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion 3
(1993).
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medieval procedures for dispute resolution, which also wove in
religious values, made workable sense.63
The second step is to move beyond a stereotype that defines the
source of cultural energy and creativity as severing secular society's
links to the religious.64 If medieval monastic life is considered not
"technically human, 6 5 Bernard of Clairvaux's critique would be of
little relevance for us today. Instead, as a matter of historical
accuracy, it is important to note that medieval monasteries were
deeply involved in and committed to the life of the societies that
surrounded them.66  Further, by acknowledging that religious
experience may actually open the door to a more profound
understanding of depths of human experience, one discovers a
treasure trove of resources to mine for profound reflection on the
most difficult themes in legal ethics.
B. A Religious Vision of Lawyers as Public Servants
The idea that the "spirit of public service" should permeate the
legal profession's commitment to the broader society is an enduring
theme in legal ethics,67 thus it is not a shock to find its roots at the
dawn of the modern legal profession. What may be surprising is to
see how well-developed and balanced are the medieval reflections on
this theme. The medieval critiques hinge on two concepts: first, an
appreciation of knowledge as a gift which entails public
responsibilities; and second, condemnation of the vices of greed and
ambition which distort the ways in which knowledge may be used for
the service of the larger community.
63. For a brilliant discussion of this theme, see The Settlement of Disputes in
Early Medieval Europe 214 (Wendy Davies & Paul Fouracre eds., 1986) [hereinafter
Davies] ("The particular forms of procedure used in the settlement of disputes do not
represent arbitrary practices at all; they are, above all, historically comprehensible.
Procedure in all our societies may be loosely described as customary, but the customs
of each society reflect its particular historical development."); id. at 215 ("Of
determinant importance to the development of dispute settlement procedures in all
societies was the church.. . . [11n all societies the practice of law was permeated with a
sense of accountability to God. This served both to limit and license the activities of
courts."); id. at 228 ("The results we have obtained show that the process of dispute
was very unlike that of the traditional picture. We can see that, although the law
codes do have some practical reality, they are over-schematic; legal practice was more
matter-of-fact than has been recognized by many legal historians. Even ritual,
cornerstone of the conventional view of early medieval irrationality, fitted clearly into
a social context that gave it meaning.").
64. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
65. Brown, supra note 5, at 319.
66. See generally Lekai, supra note 6, at 378-80 (describing the fruitful interaction
and vital link between monasteries and their surrounding secular environments);
sources discussed infra at note 100.
67. See, e.g., In the Spirit of Public Service, supra note 1, at 10 (discussing how the
"spirit of public service" should be the hallmark of the legal profession).
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1. Knowledge Entails Public Responsibilities
Throughout the middle ages, in a variety of cultures, a common and
consistent theme is that legal knowledge entails responsibilities to the
public as a whole." Bernard also recognized that knowledge is a
talent to be used and developed. As he wrote to the Archbishop elect
of Cologne, "You might do wrong if you did not put the talent of
knowledge which has been committed to you to use."69 Bernard was
certainly not averse to using the arts in public service. As he reflected
in his sermons on the Song of Songs:
I am not unmindful of the benefits scholars of the study of letters
conferred and still confer on the Church .... I have read the text:
"As you have rejected knowledge, so do I reject you from my
priesthood" and that "the learned will shine as brightly as the vault
of heaven and those who have instructed many in the ways of virtue
as bright as stars for all eternity. ,71
He acknowledged that there are those who long to know in order to
be of service, "and this is charity." 71
Further, as discussed above, Bernard also recognized the
importance of legal process as a tool to help those who suffer injustice,
particularly the poor: "We cannot abandon the downtrodden; we
cannot refuse judgment to those who suffer injustice. (Ps. 102:6;
145:7). If cases are not tried and litigants heard, how can judgment be
passed?
'72
68. Compare, for example, two lawyers, Njal and Eyolf, in a celebrated medieval
Icelandic Saga: "Njal was so great a lawyer that his match was not to be found. Wise
too he was, and foreknowing and foresighted. Of good counsel, and ready to give it,
and all that he advised men was sure to be the best for them to do .... [He] unraveled
every man's knotty points who came to see him about them." When one of his friends
considered asking for his advice, he reflected, "Tis like enough he will give me good
advice, as he gives it to every one else." The Story of Burnt Njal n.20 (Sir George
Webbe Dusent trans., 1971). Eyjolf was also recognized as a skilled lawyer, "some
said he was the third best lawyer in Iceland." In contrast to Njal, however, "you will
need to give him much money if you are to bring him into the suit." After accepting a
pricey ring at the initial consultation, Eyjolf requested, "Be most careful not to say
that ye have given goods for my help"-perhaps reflecting a certain social
opprobrium. Id. at n.137. For careful analysis of the legal themes which arise in the
medieval Icelandic Sagas, see generally, William Miller, Bloodtaking and
Peacemaking: Feud, Law and Society in Saga Iceland 221 (1990) (describing law and
legal process), and Richard A. Posner, Book Review, Medieval Iceland and Modern
Legal Scholarship, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1495 (1992).
69. See Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 43 (quoting reply to Bruno,
Letter 77.1).
70. Pennington, supra note 53, at 114-15 (translation of Sermon on the Song of
Songs, 36:2-3).
71. Id. at 116.
72. On Consideration, supra note 15, at Book 1:13; see discussion supra note 33.
See generally James A. Brundage, Legal Aid for the Poor and the Professionalization
of Law in the Middle Ages, 9 J. Legal Hist. 169, 175 (1988) (tracing the medieval roots
of legal aid to the poor, concluding, "Providing the benefits of expert skill and
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However, much depends on the spirit with which learning is
approached. When acquisition of knowledge is aimed only at self-
aggrandizement and wealth, Bernard's critique is venomous. Much of
his spiritual writing is dedicated to identifying the steps down the
ladder of pride that lead the soul away from God. One of the first
steps is vain curiositas, a trivial, irresponsible, and unworthy inquiry.73
As he colorfully describes in one of his sermons:
For there are some who long to know for the sole purpose of
knowing and that is shameful curiosity; others who long to know in
order to become known and that is shameful vanity. To such as
these we may apply the words of the Satirist, 'Your knowledge
counts for nothing unless your friends know you have it.'74
Further, removing the quest for knowledge from the context of
intent to serve the community distorts one's understanding. As he
describes in the Steps of Humility and Pride, "[K]nowledge of truth is
to be found at the 'summit of humility."'
Yes, the way of humility is a good way. Its seeks for truth, it wins
charity, it shares the fruits of wisdom. Just as the end of the Law is
Christ, so the perfection of humility is the knowledge of truth.
When Christ came he brought grace; when truth is known it brings
love. To the humble it is known. "He gives his grace to the
humble." 75
One of Bernard's contemporaries, Maurice of Saint-Victor, aptly
expressed the critique against lawyers who "seek knowledge not to
become wise but to prostitute themselves venally for men's praise or
for money. Thus, being unworthy of knowledge, they never truly
attain it."'76
knowledge for those to whom a profit economy would deny them was from the
beginning an integral characteristic of professional status.").
73. See Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 49; id. at 39 (describing the
steps down the Bernard's ladder of pride, the first being "curiositas"-the urge to
know things one should not know, as such will lead one astray from concentration on
the things of God); Evans, The Mind, supra note 11, at 163 (noting that in De
Gradibus Humilitatis, Bernard dedicates as much space to curiositas as to the other
eleven degrees of pride together). See generally Pennington, supra note 53, at 45-61
(selections from The Steps of Humility and Pride).
74. Pennington, supra note 53, at 115 (translation of On the Song of Songs, 36:2-
3); see also Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 50 (discussing the same).
75. Pennington, supra note 53, at 47 (translation of The Steps of Humility and
Pride); see also id. at 64 (translation of The Steps of Humility and Pride: commenting
on the scripture passage, remove the beam from your own eye and then you will see
better to cast the mote from your brother's: "The heavy, thick beam in the eye is
pride of heart. It is big but not strong, swollen but not solid. It blinds the eye of the
mind and blots out the truth.").
76. See Bellomo, supra note 19, at 114-15.
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2. Greed and Ambition Distort Knowledge
A second and intertwined element of Bernard's critique is that the
vices of greed and ambition block the capacity to put legal knowledge
at the service of others. As R.H. Helmholz identifies, the effect of
money on the outcome of litigation is "the subject related to legal
ethics that figures most prominently and repeatedly in the annals of
time."77
Because knowledge was considered a divine gift, some medieval
critics questioned whether lawyers should be paid at all. As the mid-
twelfth-century canonist Gratium observed in the Decretum, justice is
a gift of God, and "he who sells or purchases a gift of God is
condemned by God."7
But here, too, the tradition includes a well-developed and
sophisticated balance. Contrary to older Roman custom, there was no
blanket prohibition against charging a fee.79 Medieval canonists
recognized that advisors were entitled to earn a living, citing the
Gospel of Luke: "the labourer deserves his hire."8 Building on St.
Augustine's distinction between legal representation or advice on one
hand, and justice on the other, they concluded that the advocate was
not paid for justice, but for labor-the skilled advice and
representation in resolving conflicts."
However, crossing the line into the vices of greed and ambition
signals danger for both the individual soul and the integrity of the
profession. Bernard spares no venom in his colorful critique of the
77. R.H. Helmholz, Money and Judges in the Law of the Medieval Church, 8 U.
Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 309, 309 (2001); see also R.H. Helmholz, Ethical Standard for
Advocates and Proctors in Theory and Practice, in Canon Law and the Law of
England 41, 43-51 (1987) (discussing the evidence of canon lawyer's greed in the later
medieval church courts); Brundage, Ethics, supra note 2, at 240-41 ("Lawyers' fees
were almost universally denounced as excessive, and there was general agreement
that it was better for a man to fall in with thieves than to sue in the courts.").
78. Gratian, Decreti Para Secunda, Causa I, Quest. III. c 10 ("Qui dona Dei
vendunt cel emunt pariter a Deo Damnantur."). To search the 1879 Friedbergs
edition of Gratian's texts on line, visit the Bayerische Staats Bibliothek website:
http://mdz.bibbvb.de/digbib/ gratian/text. See generally Gaines Post, Kimon Giocarinis
& Richard Kay The Medieval Heritage of a Humanistic Ideal: "Scientia Donum Dei
Est, Unde Vendi Non Potest," 11 Traditio 195 (1955) (thorough discussion of the
medieval ideal of knowledge as a gift of God that should not be sold (scientia donum
Dei est, unde vendi non potest), as well as Greek and Patristic parallels).
79. For thorough scholarship on this topic, see James A. Brundage, Contingent
Fees and the Ius Commune, 87 Kanonistische Abteilung 125 (2001), Brundage, Ethics,
supra note 2, at 245-47 (discussing history of advocates' fees), and James A.
Brundage, The Profits of the Law: Legal Fees of University-Trained Advocates, 32
Am. J. Legal Hist. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Brundage, Profits].
80. Luke 10:7.
81. Brundage, Profits, supra note 79, at 3-4; see Baldwin, supra note 2, at 193
(discussing the distinction between illicit judicial simony and licit advocate's fees);
Evans, Law and Theology, supra note 13, at 62-63. See generally id. at 61-68
(summarizing medieval sources on the professional advocate's role).
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greed and ambition in his time: "The Church is filled with ambitious
men; in our age she shudders at the calculated strivings of ambition no
more than a den of thieves shudders at the spoils taken from
travellers. (Mt. 21:13).''2 Thus he warns Eugenius, "Does your palace
not resound all day with the voices of ambition? Is it not for its profit
that all learning of the laws and canons is sweated over? ' 's3
In context, Bernard's critique is less a condemnation of the intrinsic
nature of the legal profession, and more a call to heed the ways in
which pride, ambition, and greed may distort true knowledge which
aims to serve one's neighbor. His balanced approach to the use of
knowledge may be summarized in a passage from one of his sermons:
It implies the order, the application, and the sense of purpose with
which one approaches the object of study. The order implies that
we give precedence to all that aids spiritual progress; the application,
that we pursue more eagerly all that strengthens love more; and the
purpose, that we pursue it not through vainglory or inquisitiveness
or any base motive but for the welfare of oneself or one's neighbor.8 4
Temptations to pride, greed and ambition are certainly not modern
phenomena, and of course not limited to the legal profession. In our
modern search for cures to these maladies, and ultimate sources of
balance and restraint, religious and spiritual texts, both ancient and
modern, may provide substantive guidance.
C. A Religious Rationale for the Limits of Advocacy
1. Medieval Reflections on an Ancient Tension
Much of Bernard's critique of the legal profession focuses on the
tension between the advocacy required to represent one's client and
dedication to the truth. The theme is an ancient one in philosophical
and theological reflection." Christian theology includes a number of
82. On Consideration, supra note 15, at Book 1:13; see also Evans, Bernard of
Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 141 (stating that the ambitious were anxious to obtain the
"professional exposure from being seen as an advocate in a case where the pope was
judge").
83. On Consideration, supra note 15, at Book 3:5; see Bellomo, supra note 19, at
114 (discussing the same); Pennington, supra note 53, at 115-16 (translation of On the
Song of Songs 36:2-3: "There are still others who long for knowledge in order to sell
its fruits for money or honors, and this is shameful profiteering."); see also C.H.
Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century 216 (1957) ("[C]anon law was
stigmatized as a lucrative profession for which men deserted the higher but less
remunerative subject of theology."). See generally, John W. Baldwin, Critics of the
Legal Profession: Peter the Chanter and His Circle, in Proceedings of the Second
International Congress of Medieval Canon Law 249-59 (Stephen Kuttner & J. Joseph
Ryan eds., 1965).
84. Pennington, supra note 53, at 115 (translation of On the Song of Songs 36:2-3).
85. See e.g., Plato's Gorgias t4 (W.C. Helmhold trans., The Liberal Arts Press,
1952) (Socrates' critique of rhetoric as "a persuasion which can produce belief about
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rich metaphors for the advocate's role. References to Christ as an
advocate for humanity are common; the Holy Spirit is also referred to
as the divine advocate.86 Advocacy on behalf of the poor is a common
theme. Loyalty, reliability, and purposeful partiality were all
recognized as essential to the advocate's duties.88
As discussed above, Bernard had a keen eye for the importance of
legal process and how it may work towards the end of justice. 9 But he
also saw clear limits to advocacy. The vigor of his critique is best
understood against the broader backdrop of his whole spirituality
which is based on the search for truth.9" Bernard insisted that, "All
knowledge is good in itself provided it be founded on truth."91
Commenting on a verse from the Song of Songs about the Bride
seeking the Beloved, the soul seeking Truth, Bernard writes:
I am endowed with reason. I have a capacity for truth, but it would
be better if I did not. The love of truth is the very root of
intelligence. I am in danger if I do not have it. There is not doubt
that in this love of truth, which makes me superior to all other living
beings, the distinctive sign of the divine image shines forth
eminently.92
Other aspects of Bernard's long and colorful career, particularly his
debates with Peter Abelard, another brilliant theologian of his day,
highlight Bernard's suspicion of "formal" modes of reasoning, "unless
it is conducted in the loving spirit of a seeker after truth whose eyes
are fixed on God. 93
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that Bernard saves much
of his venom for a cutting critique of how lawyers' arguments subvert
the truth.
justice and injustice, but cannot give instruction about them"). I am indebted to both
Mark Sargent and W. Bradley Wendel for highlighting the rich parallels between
Bernard's and Socrates' critiques, a topic that would certainly merit further
scholarship.
86. John 16:7 ("[U]nless I go, the Advocate will not come to you; but if I do go, I
will send him to you."); see Evans, Law and Theology, supra note 13, at 62 (discussing
the same).
87. Evans, Law and Theology, supra note 13, at 62; see supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
88. Evans, Law and Theology, supra note 13, at 63.
89. See id. at 62; see also supra notes 55-58.
90. Charles Dumont, O.C.S.O., Pathway of Peace: Cistercian Wisdom According
to Saint Bernard 44 (Elizabeth Connor, O.C.S.O., trans., 1999). See generally id. at 43-
49 (discussing spirituality and truth).
91. Pennington, supra note 53, at 115.
92. See also Dumont, supra note 90, at 45 (quoting Sermon 77 On the Song of
Songs).
93. Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, supra note 11, at 43; see also id. at 43 ("Bernard
was impatient with verbal subtleties of a type different from his own. He describes
Abelard's reasoning as a war of words (pugnae verborum) marred by novelties of
expression (novitiates vocum).").
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I am astonished that you, a man of piety, can bear to listen to
lawyers dispute and argue in a way which tends more to subvert the
truth than to reveal it.... These men have taught their tongues to
speak lies (Jer. 9:5). They are fluent against justice. They are
schooled in falsehood. They are wise in order to do evil; they are
eloquent to assail truth.... These it is who instruct those by whom
they should have been taught, who introduce not facts but their own
fabrications, who heap up calumny of their own invention against
innocent people, who destroy the simplicity of truth, who obstruct
the ways of justice.""
In another passage, his suggested method to "[r]eform this corrupt
tradition" would render the lawyers silent: "cut off their lying tongues
and shut their deceitful mouths. (Ps. 11:4)." 95 Other lines are a bit
more gentle, suggesting that there might be room for argument in a
way that does not subvert the truth: "Nothing reveals the truth so
readily as a simply straightforward presentation."96
Overall, however, Bernard's contrast between the "laws of
Justinian" and the laws of the Lord seems to leave the two worlds far
apart:
Oh yes, every day laws resound through the palace, but these are the
laws of Justinian, not of the Lord. Is this just? Consider for a
moment. Surely, the Law of the Lord is perfect, converting souls.
But these are not so much laws as wrangling and sophistry,
subverting judgment. Tell me, therefore, how can you, as bishop
and shepherd of souls, allow the Law to stand silent before you
while these others rattle on? I am at a loss if this perversity does not
cause you anxiety. I think that sometimes this should cause you to
cry with the Prophet to the Lord, "Evil people have told me tales,
but they are not like your Law."
97
Such a line of analysis echoes the Second Lateran Council's
scathing critique: lawyers "confuse what is right and what is wrong,
justice and iniquity" by reason of "the variety of their arguments."98
Of all the critiques, this line of analysis seems to cut deepest into the
heart of the legal profession's timeless ethical dilemma: is betrayal of
the truth intrinsic to the assumption of an advocate's role? Under
Bernard's analysis, is advocacy, as we understand it in today's legal
profession, doomed? Should this aspect of Bernard's analysis,
particularly his dedication to Truth with a capital "T" be written off as
94. On Consideration, supra note 15, at Book 1:13.
95. Id.; see also Baldwin, supra note 2, at 193 (discussing Peter the Chanter's
critique in the latter twelfth century, "just as the prostitute sets a price on her bodily
members so the lawyer sells his tongue").
96. Id. at Book 1:13.
97. Id. at Book 1:5.
98. Tanner, supra note 31, at 198 (emphasis added); see supra note 31 (discussing
the Second Lateran Council).
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too arcane to be relevant for the challenges of today's legal
profession?
2. Three Avenues for Further Inquiry
Before this aspect of Bernard's analysis is dismissed, three avenues
of further inquiry, building on well-laid foundations, may be worthy of
consideration.
a. Further Analysis of the Room for a "Variety of Arguments" in
Twelfth-Century Legal Procedure
One might be tempted to box Bernard's analysis into a stereotype
of the medieval mind as rigid and inflexible in its monolithic sense of
truth, with little patience for and appreciation of "the variety of
arguments." After all, what could we expect from a pre-rational
society that continued to turn to the ordeal, a trial by fire or water, in
cases of uncertain proof?99
Paradoxically, twelfth-century conceptions and methods for
discovering "truth" may be an area in which further research could be
most fruitful for discussions about the legal profession's commitment
to truth. Recent studies of the uses of the ordeal reveal an
extraordinary procedural sophistication that not only allowed room
for a variety of arguments, but also for forging genuine community
consensus."' ° Building on the already thoughtful scholarship in this
area may add an interesting layer to an analysis of Bernard's
reflections.
b. Further Exploration of Religiously Mediated "Alternative Dispute
Resolution"
Further inquiry into medieval alternatives to the "wrangling and
sophistry" of the "laws of Justinian" also opens the horizon to the
fascinating contours of religiously mediated alternative dispute
resolution. Stephen D. White's careful studies of monasteries' roles in
99. See, e.g., Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water 34 (1984) (outlining and
subsequently challenging the "standard argument" that the abandonment in the
thirteenth century was part of the rationalization of proof in Europe: "modernization
demanded by more advanced social structures and a higher intellectual level"). See
also discussion supra note 3.
100. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 63, at 222 (discussing how the medieval ordeal was
often a "ritualized version of community decisions," expressing "group solidarities
that were necessary for any successful action in any court"); Stephen D. White,
Proposing the Ordeal and Avoiding It: Strategy and Power in Western French
Litigation, 1050-1110, in Cultures of Power 89 (Thoman N. Bisson ed., 1995)
(describing how proposals to use the ordeal were used to gain a tactical advantage in
litigation). See generally Olson, supra note 3; Law and Revolution, supra note 8, at 57-
58 (describing how the outcome of the ordeal was subject to community consensus
and allowed room to maneuver in accord with practical community needs).
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dispute resolution in eleventh- and twelfth-century France not only
explode myths that medieval monasteries were completely removed
from their surrounding social networks and disputes, but also
highlight the positive and constructive values prized in twelfth-century
culture: compromise, enduring relationships, and forgiveness."" The
initial research indicates that the seemingly "Dark Ages" could shed
light on creative solutions to the irrational violence of our own
adversarial system.""
c. Spirituality and Advocacy: Bernard's Invitation
Perhaps the greatest invitation that Bernard's life and writings
poses to a modern lawyer is to delve into his profound and creative
spirituality to discover how his completely different perspective on
"worldly affairs" may present not only relevant and refreshing
challenges, but also interesting solutions.
For example, further exploration of Bernard's steps of truth might
open an interesting window on models for the lawyer's role as an
advocate. Discussing the order of the degrees of truth, Bernard
explained,
First of all, truth teaches us that we must look for it in our neighbors
before we seek it in itself.... The merciful quickly grasp the truth in
their neighbors when their heart goes out to them with a love that
101. Stephen D. White, Feuding and Peace-Making in the Touraine Around the
Year 1100, 42 Traditio 195, 208-09 (1986) ("[S]ince monks had an established
obligation to mediate between human and supernatural beings and since they
effectively mediated between living nobles and these people's dead kinsmen, it is not
surprising that they were considered appropriate mediators under other
circumstances."); Stephen D. White, Pactum . .. Legem Vincit et Amor Judicium: The
Settlement of Disputes by Compromise in Eleventh Century Western France, 22 Am. J.
Legal Hist., 281, 308 (1978) (concluding that "the marked tendency of disputants to
choose concord rather than judgment was probably the outgrowth of existing social
and political structures and of prevalent social attitudes"); see also Patrick Geary,
Living in Conflict in Stateless France: A Typology of Conflict Management
Mechanisms, 1050-1200, in Living With the Dead in the Middle Ages 128 (1994)
(outlining medieval society's numerous nonlegal means of dealing with conflict, which
appear to be evidence of anarchy "only when observed from a particularly narrow
and formalist legal historical perspective"); Valerie A. Sanchez, Towards a History of
ADR: The Dispute Processing Continuum in Anglo-Saxon England and Today, 11
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1 (1996) (discussing multiple dispute processing methods
used in Anglo-Saxon England in the seventh through eleventh centuries, focusing on
secular sources).
102. I have yet to find a discussion of the twelfth-century Cistercian monasteries'
role in dispute resolution, but I suspect that material would be abundant. See Lekai,
supra note 6, at 379 ("In spite of the fact that Cistercians did not wish to play any role
in the feudal establishment, it seems that in cases when it was clearly to the benefit of
their peasant neighbors, some abbots did assume the responsibility of a protector or
advocate.").
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unites them so closely that they feel their neighbor's good and ill as
if it were their own."'
103
For those who become weak with the weak, rejoice with those who
rejoice, and weep with those who weep, "[t]heir hearts are made more
clear-sighted by love, and they experience the delight of
contemplating truth, not now in others but in itself, and for the love of
it they bear their neighbor's sorrow."10 4
Texts such as these could provide a rich source of reflection on the
advocate's role. Perhaps Bernard would appreciate a definition of
advocacy along these lines: to enter into another's sorrow, and then
with a heart made clear-sighted by love, to speak on his or her behalf.
The possibilities are endless. Bernard extends a standing invitation.
CONCLUSION
It may be surprising to observe that the complexities, struggles and
questions that the nascent legal profession faced in the twelfth century
mirror in many ways the challenges we face today. How to curtail
avarice and ambition in a lucrative profession that opens the door to
public advancement and how to resolve the conflicting demands of
advocacy and the truth are themes that pertain to the timeless
struggles not only of the legal profession, but of human nature. An
initial glimpse of the view from a mid-twelfth-century monastery
suggests that it may provide helpful insight and guidance for today's
efforts to define and maintain our professional commitments and
values.
103. Pennington, supra note 53, at 62 (translation of the Steps of Humility and
Pride).
104. Id.
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